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RULE 35 STATEMENT
The United States seeks panel rehearing and rehearing en banc because the
panel misapprehended a question of exceptional importance when it erroneously
invalidated part of an Act of Congress—and it did so even though its disposition of
that constitutional question failed to provide any actual relief to either party and was
thus unnecessary to the resolution of this case.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Since its enactment in 1991, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
has restricted the use of certain automated technologies when calling individuals’ cell
phones without their consent. Congress found that these technologies substantially
increase the volume and nuisance of such calls, and by restricting their use Congress
sought to safeguard individuals’ privacy. This Court has twice held that the
restriction, as originally enacted, is consistent with the First Amendment.
Facebook’s motion to dismiss this suit on First Amendment grounds is
premised on a 2015 amendment that allows the use of these technologies in making
calls to collect government-backed debts. Facebook urges that the exception is
content-based and renders the restriction as a whole subject to strict scrutiny. The
government intervened to defend the validity of these provisions and explained that
the exception is in any event severable from the concededly valid remainder of the
statute. The panel held that the government-debt exception violates the First
Amendment but agreed that the provision is severable.
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Although the panel’s severability analysis is correct, the result of its decision is
to partially invalidate an Act of Congress without affording any party meaningful
relief. Facebook’s alleged misconduct has nothing to do with the government-debt
exception, and the invalidation of that provision does not save Facebook from suit.
Rather, Facebook is alleged to have violated provisions that have been in place since
the TCPA’s enactment and that remain in place following the panel’s decision.
Under the circumstances, the panel should have avoided the constitutional
question by addressing severability first. The Court should assume, arguendo, that the
exception is invalid, and then, after holding that the exception is severable, conclude
that Facebook’s motion to dismiss should be denied on that basis without
unnecessarily deciding the constitutionality of the statutory provision. Doing so is
consistent with longstanding principles counseling the avoidance of constitutional
questions when an alternative ground for decision is available.
Even if it had been appropriate to reach the constitutional question, moreover,
the panel’s holding was in error. The government-debt exception is content-neutral,
and the autodialer restriction in any event withstands strict scrutiny. In holding
otherwise, the panel partially invalidated an Act of Congress based on a flawed
analysis, and that error provides an additional basis for rehearing.

2
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STATEMENT
A. Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991 in response to complaints about the
intrusion on personal and residential privacy caused by the growing number of
automated phone calls. Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(5)-(6), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991).
To protect the privacy interests implicated by these calls, Congress made it unlawful
“to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the
prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to a cell phone or similar service. 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). A text message is a “call” for purposes of this provision.
Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2017). In
2015, Congress amended the TCPA to provide that the autodialer restriction does not
apply to calls “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United
States.” Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301(a)(1)(A), 129 Stat.
584, 588. Prior to the amendment’s enactment, this Court twice held that the
autodialer restriction is content-neutral and consistent with the First Amendment.
Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663
(2016); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995).
B. In March 2015, plaintiff Noah Duguid filed suit on behalf of himself and a
putative class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that Facebook had used an
autodialer to send him text messages without his consent. Duguid alleges that he has
never had a Facebook account. Facebook moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff had
3
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failed to state a claim, and that the autodialer restriction violates the First
Amendment. The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the
statute. In February 2017, the district court granted Facebook’s motion on
nonconstitutional grounds, holding that plaintiff had not adequately alleged
Facebook’s use of an autodialer. Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-985, 2017 WL
635117, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017).
C. On June 13, 2019, a panel of this Court reversed and remanded, holding
that plaintiff had adequately alleged the use of an autodialer, and that, although the
government-debt exception is unconstitutional, it is severable from the concededly
valid remainder of the statute that Facebook is alleged to have violated. Duguid v.
Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146. With respect to the constitutional question, the panel
first rejected the government’s argument that the exception is content-neutral. The
panel concluded that the “exception’s applicability turns entirely on the content of the
communication—i.e., whether it is ‘solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by
the United States’”—and held that “[t]he identity and relationship of the caller are
irrelevant” to that inquiry. Id. at 1153 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)). The
panel next held that the exception does not withstand strict scrutiny because calls to
collect government-backed debts undermine the government’s privacy interests,
making the autodialer restriction underinclusive. Id. at 1155. The panel further held
that the exception could be severed from the remainder of the statute because
“[e]xcising the debt-collection exception preserves the fundamental purpose of the
4
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TCPA and leaves us with the same content-neutral TCPA that [the Court] upheld . . .
in Moser and Gomez.” Id. at 1157.
ARGUMENT
The TCPA Is Consistent with the First Amendment,
and the Panel Erred in Partially Invalidating a Federal Statute
When That Constitutional Question Could Be Avoided.
Rehearing is needed because the panel erroneously invalidated part of a federal
statute, and it did so when that holding was unnecessary to the resolution of this case.
There is no dispute as to the validity of the autodialer restriction as initially
enacted. Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S.
Ct. 663 (2016); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995). That provision was in
effect for more than twenty years before the government-debt exception was added,
and the exception did not fundamentally alter the character of the statute. As it did
prior to the exception’s enactment, the autodialer restriction prevents tens of millions
of intrusive calls every day, thereby protecting the residential and personal privacy
interests that these calls otherwise threaten.
Although Facebook’s argument for dismissal has focused on the governmentdebt exception, Facebook does not allege that it has been harmed by the exception
itself, and the panel’s invalidation of that provision does not provide Facebook any
relief. Under the circumstances, rather than partially invalidating a federal statute in
an essentially advisory opinion, the panel should have avoided the constitutional

5
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question by considering the severability analysis first and holding that Facebook’s
motion should be dismissed on that basis.
A. The government-debt exception comports with the First Amendment, but
the panel did not need to reach that question to resolve the dispute in this case. The
validity of the autodialer restriction as initially enacted is well established in this
Circuit. See Gomez, 768 F.3d at 876; Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. Because the exception is
plainly severable from the undisputedly valid remainder of the statute, the exception’s
validity is not determinative in this case. Accordingly, the panel should have started
with the severability analysis and thereby avoided an unnecessary constitutional ruling.
The panel correctly held that the government-debt exception is severable.
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2019). “Whether an
unconstitutional provision is severable from the remainder of the statute in which it
appears is largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption is in favor of
severability.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984); see Free Enter. Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010). “[T]he invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law,” Regan, 468 U.S. at 653, and would
continue to “function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress,” Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
Here, Congress provided an express severability provision, 47 U.S.C. § 608, and
the statute operated for more than two decades before the government-debt
exception was added, leaving no doubt that Congress would have intended the
6
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autodialer restriction to continue to function in the exception’s absence. The fact that
this is a First Amendment case in no way changes the analysis. See Gresham v. Swanson,
866 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 682 (2018) (severing an
invalid, content-based exception from an otherwise valid state autodialer restriction).
The government-debt exception has nothing to do with Facebook’s conduct in
this case. Although Facebook depends on the exception for its constitutional
argument, Facebook can obtain relief from this suit only if the Court finds the
autodialer provision as a whole unconstitutional—a result that the severability analysis
forecloses. Accordingly, rather than address the exception’s constitutionality, the
panel could have assumed, arguendo, that the exception is invalid and held that
Facebook’s motion to dismiss should nevertheless be denied based on the exception’s
severability from the remainder of the statute.
This approach is consistent with the rule that courts normally “will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the
case.” Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009); see
McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977) (“The canons of
constitutional litigation dictate that we initially consider the statutory issue of
separability before we turn to the question of constitutionality.”). Addressing
severability at the outset follows the example of other cases. For instance, the
Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983), considered whether a
provision was severable from the remainder of the statute before addressing the
7
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constitutionality of the provision in circumstances in which the redressability of the
plaintiff’s injury turned on the answer to the severability question. And in Patriotic
Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, 845 F.3d 303, 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2321 (2017),
the Seventh Circuit declined to reach the validity of an exception to a state autodialer
restriction when it “would do plaintiff no good.” See Advantage Media, LLC v. City of
Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 799-801 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to consider a First
Amendment challenge to severable provisions of a sign ordinance). Here, too, the
panel should have avoided a constitutional decision that provided no party relief.
Avoiding the constitutional question does not insulate the government-debt
exception from review but rather ensures that the constitutional issue is reached only
as necessary and when presented by an appropriate party. An individual receiving
unwanted debt-collection calls pursuant to the exception could likely challenge that
provision, and the Court could consider the constitutionality of the exception in
circumstances in which its validity determines the availability of relief.
B. The panel in any event erred in holding that the government-debt
exception is invalid. That conclusion misapprehends the federal government’s role in
this scheme. It is well established that the government is not subject to the TCPA’s
restrictions, including the autodialer provision. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. at 672. The
government-debt exception simply allows private parties to make calls that the
government could itself make to collect past-due loans that are backed by the
government. Congress has broad authority to decide that, for particular purposes,
8
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private entities should be treated as though they were part of the government. Just as
the government is largely unconstrained by the First Amendment when it engages in
its own speech, see Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2246 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009), the
government has a freer hand when it enlists the services of private parties to convey
the government’s message than when it differentiates among purely private speakers.
This is true even if the private parties are not acting as the government’s agents.
The government-debt exception is principally based on whether the person
being called has a specified economic relationship with the federal government. The
exception allows calls that pertain directly to that relationship, and that the
government could in any event make itself in order to protect the public fisc. The
resulting calls serve the government’s financial interests by decreasing the likelihood
that the government will ultimately be required to make good on its guarantees.
Other courts of appeals have upheld exceptions that single out certain types of
speech based on the relationship between the caller and the person being called. For
example, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have upheld state autodialer restrictions that
make exceptions for calls by school districts to students or parents, and by employers
in connection with employee work schedules. See Gresham, 866 F.3d at 854; Patriotic
Veterans, 845 F.3d at 304. Here, it is the government rather than the caller that has the
pertinent relationship with the person being called. But that fact does not change the
analysis. In determining whether a provision is content-based, the question is whether
9
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the law’s applicability turns entirely on the content of the regulated speech. Where a
statute’s applicability turns largely on the existence of a specified relationship and not
solely on the subject matter of the call, the provision is not content-based. See Patriotic
Veterans, 845 F.3d at 304; Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1550 (8th Cir. 1995).
For the government-debt exception to apply, a call need not refer to the
necessary government relationship, it need only be true that the relationship exists.
Thus, a person could receive two identical debt-collection calls that follow precisely
the same script—for example, “Your student loan from Citibank is past due; please
visit your online account to make a payment”—and the TCPA might treat the calls
differently depending on the underlying relationship between the government and the
person receiving the call. The fact that the exception may treat identical calls
differently underscores that the provision principally turns on the existence of a
particular economic relationship between the government and a debtor, and not on
the content of the call.
In order to fall within the exception, a call must additionally be germane to the
specified economic relationship—that is, it must concern the collection of a
government-backed debt and not an unrelated matter. The requirement of
germaneness, and the narrow tailoring that it reflects, does not serve to make the
exception content-based. Many federal statutes regulate communications concerning
discrete spheres of economic activity. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, for
example, regulates debt-collection activities, but not efforts to induce consumers to
10
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borrow money. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6)(C), 1692b-1692g. And the securities laws
regulate securities transactions and related activities, but not the selling of cars or
other goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 77w. To the extent those laws regulate communicative
activity, they are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. But no court has suggested
that they are subject to strict scrutiny simply because they regulate speech related to
particular, narrowly defined spheres of commercial activity. That is so even though
the content of the regulated speech will vary according to the nature of the economic
activity involved (e.g., a person who is trying to sell securities will use different words
than a person who is trying to sell cars). The same is true here. The fact that the
government-debt exception is concerned with calls made to prevent the public losses
that may result from a particular economic relationship between the government and
a debtor does not serve to make the law content-based.
Because its application does not turn solely on the content of the speech at
issue, the government-debt exception is unlike the ordinance in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015), the applicability of which turned entirely on what was
being said. At issue in Reed was a sign ordinance that exempted twenty-three
categories of signs from a general permit requirement and subjected those signs to
different rules based solely on their message. 135 S. Ct. at 2224-25. One did not need
to consider anything other than the content of the speech at issue to determine how
that law applied. Under the ordinance, the requirements that “appl[ied] to any given
sign thus depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign,” and the Court
11
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held the ordinance subject to strict scrutiny on that basis. Id. at 2227 (emphasis
added). Because the same is not true of the government-debt exception, it is contentneutral and subject only to intermediate scrutiny—a standard of review that it readily
withstands for the same reasons that it withstands strict scrutiny, as discussed below.
C. The autodialer restriction would withstand strict scrutiny if that standard
applied because the statute is narrowly tailored to further the government’s
compelling interest in protecting residential and personal privacy. When Congress
enacted the TCPA in 1991, it found that the volume of unwanted calls had increased
substantially with the advent of low-cost, automated devices that were able to dial as
many as one thousand phone numbers per hour and deliver a prerecorded message to
the person being called. S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970. Even with the less advanced technologies available at that
time, tens of thousands of solicitors were collectively calling millions of people each
day. Id. In addition to expressing concern about the volume of automated calls,
“Congress determined that such calls were more of a nuisance and a greater invasion
of privacy than calls placed by live persons because such calls cannot interact with the
customer except in preprogrammed ways and do not allow the caller to feel the
frustration of the called party.” Moser, 46 F.3d at 972 (quotation marks omitted).
The technologies supporting automated calls have advanced since the TCPA
was enacted, and the potential volume and nuisance of such calls have likewise

12
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increased. When coupled with the now-pervasive use of cell phones, automated calls
threaten to disrupt nearly every aspect of our lives if not adequately regulated.
The government’s interest in “protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy
of the home is certainly of the highest order,” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980),
and that compelling interest also extends beyond the residential space, see Gomez, 768
F.3d at 876. Unwanted calls intrude on our privacy in the most intimate of places,
including hospitals, places of worship, and places of work, and it is not always an
option simply to turn off one’s phone.
The autodialer restriction is narrowly tailored to protect against such intrusions.
Even with the recent addition of the government-debt exception, the restriction does
substantial work in preventing the deluge of unwanted calls that would otherwise
result by imposing a high-tech time, place, or manner restriction that targets precisely
those types of calls that Congress found to cause the greatest intrusion. There is no
dispute regarding the validity of the restriction as originally enacted, see Gomez, 768
F.3d at 876; Moser, 46 F.3d at 974-75, and the limited number of additional calls
allowed by the government-debt exception—calls that Congress singled out in order
to protect the public fisc—do not do appreciable harm to the privacy interests that
the restriction seeks to protect.
Notwithstanding the broader statutory context, the panel “focus[ed] [its]
analysis on the content-based differentiation—the debt-collection exception—not on
the TCPA overall.” Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1155. That framing misses the mark.
13
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Facebook challenged the constitutionality of the autodialer restriction, and the
restriction is the relevant unit of analysis. Indeed, the government-debt exception
could not itself be the sole focus of a First Amendment inquiry because it in no way
limits speech or expression. The exception is thus relevant to the First Amendment
inquiry only insofar as it might be thought to call the validity of the autodialer
restriction into doubt. The traditional framing of the underinclusivity inquiry
underscores this focus by asking whether an exception “raise[s] ‘doubts about whether
the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes’” in support of a restriction
on speech. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015); see Reed, 135 S.
Ct. at 2232 (holding that a “law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the
highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited”).
The question is thus whether the autodialer restriction, inclusive of any
exceptions, is adequately tailored to the government’s interests. The panel erred in
answering that question in the negative. In considering the statute as a whole, the
panel focused on the fact that calls to collect government-backed debts can cause the
same sort of privacy intrusion that the autodialer restriction is meant to prevent.
Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1155. That analysis overlooks two important points. First, the
automated calls allowed by the exception are distinguishable from those that the
statute prohibits because the former advance the government’s interest in protecting
the public fisc. Accordingly, the statute is not guilty of treating similar calls
14
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differently. Second, the government-debt exception allows only a limited number of
calls not already allowed by the concededly valid remainder of the statute, and
therefore does not do appreciable harm to the privacy interests that the statute
protects. Even without the government-debt exception, the autodialer restriction
allows debt-collection calls that are made by the government or its agents, or with the
consent of the party being called. 1 The only additional calls authorized by the
exception are those made by private entities that are not acting pursuant to a federal
contract and that have not obtained the debtor’s consent. There is no reason to think
the number of such calls is substantial.
An exception that allows only a small number of potentially intrusive
communications in relation to those that the statute prevents—and that does so in
furtherance of an independent government interest—does not raise the same
underinclusivity concerns as the ordinance in Reed. The exceptions to that ordinance
allowed the “unlimited proliferation” of speech that presented precisely the type of
harm the statute was meant to prevent, and there was no basis for the city’s uneven
treatment of different types of speech. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231. The governmentdebt exception presents no such problem. It allows only incrementally more
automated calls than those already allowed by the restriction itself. And the additional

A debtor can give consent by, for example, providing a cell phone number in
connection with a loan application. See 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 564, ¶ 9 (2008).
15
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calls authorized by the exception further the government’s interest in protecting the
public fisc, thus distinguishing them from other types of calls.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID L. ANDERSON
United States Attorney
MARK B. STERN
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s/ Lindsey Powell
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